Travelers Express Company v. The State of Utah : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Travelers Express Company v. The State of Utah :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. Ridd Larson; Douglas Matsumori; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Joseph P. McCarthy; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Defendants-Appellants.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Travelers Express Company v. Utah, No. 19216.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1650
SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
45.9 
.S9 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOCKET NO, ffg?/k 
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, Inc., 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, EDWARD T. ALTER, 
in his capacity as Treasurer 
of the State of Utah, and VAL 
OVESON, in his capacity as 
Auditor of the State of Utah, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
CASE NO. 19216 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
L. RIDD LARSON 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996 
Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff-
Respondent 
pem 1%XUit 
I , * T T wcsae the 
JAN29iS37 o 
Cfrric, Supreme Court* Utah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, Inc., 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
STATE OF UTAH, EDWARD T. ALTER, 
in his capacity as Treasurer 
of the State of Utah, and VAL 
OVESON, in his capacity as 
Auditor of the State of Utah, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
CASE NO. 19216 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH p. MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
L. RIDD LARSON 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996 
Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff-
Respondent 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THE ASSERTION OF THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSENTING 
OPINION IN THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 
CASE AND IN OTHER CASES CITED BY THE COURT, THAT 
ALLOWING APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
PROVISION WOULD VIRTUALLY NULLIFY THE STATE'S 
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT IS ERRONEOUS. ACCORDINGLY, 
THE ADOPTION OF THAT ASSERTION AS A VALID CONCLUSION 
AND AS A BASIS FOR REASONING BY THE COURT IN THIS 
CASE IS ALSO ERRONEOUS 6 
II. IF THE STATE'S UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT IS, IN FACT, 
NOT EVISCERATED BY THE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS EXCEPTION, THEN THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO 
CIRCUMVENT THE APPLICATION OF THAT EXCEPTION IS 
IMPERMISSIBLE "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION" AND MAY, IN 
FACT, BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ACTUAL INTENT OF 
THE LEGISLATURE 10 
III. THE MODIFIED DERIVATIVE RIGHTS RULE ANNOUNCED BY 
THE COURT IN THIS CASE IS ANNOUNCED WITHOUT ANY 
STATED BASIS IN REASON AND IS WITHOUT DISCERNIBLE 
STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION AND IS, IN ANY EVENT, 
MISAPPLIED WITH RESPECT TO THIS CASE 12 
CONCLUSION 14 
RULE 35 CERTIFICATE 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 15 
- l -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston, 58 Cal. 2d 462, 466 
374 P.2d 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1962) 4 
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Department of Revenue, 78 Wash. 2d 961, 
481 P.2d 556 (1971) 3, 6, 7 
State Department of Revenue v. Puget Sound Power, 
103 Wash. 2d 501, 694 P.2d 7 (1985) Passim 
State ex. rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 
668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983) Passim 
Treasurer and Receiver General v. John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., 388 Mass. 410, 
446 N.E.2d 1376 (1983) 3, 4, 11 
Statutes 
Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §§ 1500-1527 (West 1982) . . . . . . . . . 4 
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1, 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-122(2), as amended 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-2 (pre-1983 amendment) 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-30(1) (pre-1983 amendment) . . . . Passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-30(1), as amended 7 
Wash. Rev. Code § 63.28.225, recodified at § 63.29.290 . . . 3, 7 
Other 
Unif. Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 
8A U.L.A. 223 (1983) ..'.'.' Passim 
-ii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, Inc., 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, EDWARD T. ALTER, 
in his capacity as Treasurer 
of the State of Utah, and VAL 
OVESON, in his capacity as 
Auditor of the State of Utah, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 19216 
00O00 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Travelers Express Company, Inc., 
petitions this Court, under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure for rehearing and reargument of the above-entitled 
matter. Plaintiff-Respondent, in recognition of the significant 
and burdensome demands on the time and resources of the Court, has 
made its decision to petition for rehearing only after long and 
deliberate consideration of the basis for such a request. This 
petition is not, therefore, made lightly or upon any normally 
expected losing party or attorney incredulity over an adverse 
decision. 
The Court has chosen to overrule its previous decision in 
State ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 668 P.2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
503 (Utah 1983), in reliance upon the dissenting opinion of a 
justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in a case 
which was decided and published after briefing and oral argument 
by the parties in this case. While it is not the petitioner's 
contention that the Court should refrain from consideration of 
relevant decisions by courts made subsequent to briefing and 
argument of cases before it; it is the contention of the 
petitioner that under the circumstances involved here, it is not 
within the bounds of fairness or judicial wisdom to do so without 
allowing the parties the opportunity to provide the light that 
opposing argument can bring to the interpretation and application 
of such additional references. 
In particular, where the Court, as in this instance, 
(i) applies and adopts reasoning from a dissent in a case decided 
in the Supreme Court of another jurisdiction, which opinion 
is not, of course, precedent in that jurisdiction;1 (ii) bases 
its rationale for such application and adoption upon, what this 
petitioner believes can be shown to be an erroneous 
lrThe Court appears to place heavy reliance upon the 
reasoning and arguments advanced by Justice Dore in the dissenting 
portion of his concurring and dissenting opinion in the Washington 
State Supreme Court case of State Department of Revenue v. Puget 
Sound Power, 103 Wash. 2d 501, 694 P.2d 7, 13-16 (1985). More 
importantly, the dissent is made in the face of a majority and, 
therefore, binding legal conclusion for the State of Washington, 
which actually is in agreement with (a) the position of petitioner, 
(b) the conclusions of the trial court in the case at bar and 
(c) the conclusions of this Court in the decision overruled by the 
opinion from which Petitioner is now taking exception. 
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assessment of the law in effect (which error this Court, by 
adoption, shares); (iii) by such application and adoption, 
Continued: 
In Puget Sound, the State sought utility deposits and 
dividends paid on deposits under Washington's Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act which was amended in 1979 to include Section 16. 
That Court's majority said: 
The Washington Legislature enacted the 
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act in 
1955. The measure is an almost exact duplicate 
of the model UPA. 8A U.L.A. 223 (1983). 
Significantly, the model UPA has a section which 
provides that periods of limitations shall not be 
a bar to the state's right to the property. UPA 
§ 16, 8A U.L.A. 257 (1983). The Washington 
Legislature chose not to include that provision 
when it enacted Washington's UPA. The Department 
twice tried unsuccessfully to amend the UPA, 
first to provide access to certain abandoned 
property before the owner's statute of 
limitations had run, and then to add § 16 of the 
model UPA. Unable to convince the Legislature, 
the Department finally adopted its own rule in 
1968 which closely paralleled UPA § 16. This 
court struck down the regulation as being beyond 
the rulemaking power of the agency. Pacific 
Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Rev., 
78 Wash.2d 961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971). Finally, in 
1979 the Legislature enacted RCW 63.28.225 which 
is a codification of UPA § 16. 
The Department cites cases from other 
jurisdictions which have refused to permit 
statutes of limitations to preclude the state's 
right to abandoned property. However, reliance 
to those cases is mistaken. . . . The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted a 
provision of its abandoned property act to 
require reporting of abandoned property even 
after the owners' rights had ceased. Treasurer 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
overturns not only the decision of the trial court, but its own 
well-reasoned precedent from a prior case; and further, and more 
Continued: 
and Receiver General v. John Hancock Must, Life 
Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 410, 446 N.E.2d 1376 (1983). 
However, there the court was interpreting a 
substantially different abandoned property scheme 
and specific statutory language which does not 
appear in our UPA. Although the sentiment the 
court expresses appears relevant, the factual 
differences in the cases make it unpersuasive in 
this situation. 
The California legislature adopted an 
abandoned property statute similar to 
Washington's in 1959. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§§ 1500-1527 (West 1982). Their statute, 
however, included a provision, similar to § 16 
of the model UPA, which requires an abandoned 
property report despite the availability of a 
limitations defense against the owner. While 
deciding a holder's statute of limitations 
defense to a claim by the state, the California 
Supreme Court took pains to clarify that the 
statute applied only to claims on which the 
statute of limitations had run between the holder 
and the owner after the effective date of the 
statute. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v. Cranston, 
58 Cal.2d 462, 466, 374 P.2d 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 
851 (1962). The analysis supports Puget's 
position that prior to Washington's adoption of 
RCW 63.28.225, the limitations defense available 
against the owner was applicable against the 
Department as well. 
* * * 
[6] Based on the legislative history of 
the UPA and our prior case law, we find that the 
Department had no greater right to the utility 
deposits abandoned between 1955 and 1979 than 
did the owners. Since the owners' rights were 
extinguished after 6 years, the Department has no 
right to those deposits presumed abandoned after 
7 years. (Emphasis added) 
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importantly, (iv) by so doing, engages in what this petitioner can 
only conclude is impermissible "judicial legislation"; further 
argument and briefing afforded by a rehearing is clearly justified. 
Indeed, justice mandates such opportunity for both parties in the 
interest of avoiding the establishment of precedent which petitioner 
believes that the Court, after due reconsideration, would not wish 
to be established for this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The assertion of the author of the dissenting opinion 
in the Washington State Supreme Court case and in other cases cited 
by the Court, that allowing application of the statute of 
limitations provision would "virtually nullify" the State's 
Unclaimed Property Act, is erroneous. Accordingly, the adoption of 
that assertion as a valid conclusion and basis for reasoning by the 
Court in this case is also erroneous. 
II. If the State's Unclaimed Property Act is, in fact, 
not eviscerated by the application of a statute of limitations 
exception, then the Court's attempt to circumvent the application 
of that exception is impermissible "judicial legislation" and may, 
Continued: 
Utah's history of the Uniform Act is substantially the 
same as Washington's except Washington included Section 16 in 1979 
and Utah did not include it until July 1, 1983. 
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in fact, be in contravention of the actual intent of the 
Legislature. 
III. The modified derivative rights rule announced by 
the Court in this case does not have a basis in reason, is without 
discernible standards for application and is, in any event, 
misapplied with respect to this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ASSERTION OF THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSENTING OPINION 
IN THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT CASE AND IN OTHER CASES 
CITED BY THE COURT, THAT ALLOWING APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS PROVISION WOULD VIRTUALLY NULLIFY THE STATE'S 
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT IS ERRONEOUS. ACCORDINGLY, THE ADOPTION OF 
THAT ASSERTION AS A VALID CONCLUSION AND AS A BASIS FOR REASONING 
BY THE COURT IN THIS CASE IS ALSO ERRONEOUS. 
The Court, in its opinion, gives considerable attention 
to the assertion of Justice Dore, dissenting in the Puget Sound 
decision, that the Washington State Supreme Court's prior decision 
in Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Department of Revenue, 
78 Wash.2d 961 and 481 P.2d 556 (1971) (en banc) (also relied upon 
by this Court in its decision in State ex rel Baker) -virtually 
nullified this state's unclaimed property act." Supra at 14. In 
Northwest Bell, the Washington Supreme Court had, as did this 
court in State ex rel Baker, concluded that where the state 
legislature had failed to enact section 16 of the model Uniform 
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (the -Uniform Act-) 
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(providing that the intervention of a statute of limitations could 
not be asserted against the State with respect to reporting or 
turnover of unclaimed property to the State), the holder of 
unclaimed property could assert a statute of limitations defense 
to reporting and transfer to the State. Justice Dore takes great 
pains to detail the manner in which the Northwest Bell decision 
"nullifies" the Washington State Unclaimed Property Act. Justice 
Dore carefully recites the "abandonment" periods applicable to 
each category of property which was covered by Washington's 
unclaimed property act (prior to the enactment of Uniform Act 
§ 16) and then asserts (without any detailed analysis), that the 
applicable periods in every instance, are longer than the statute 
of limitations for such property. Justice Dore then concludes 
that the consequences of Northwest Bell are "to effectively repeal 
the Act." This Court apparently buys into that reasoning 
wholeheartedly. This Court, citing similar language in other 
cases, repeatedly makes reference to the "frustration of the 
public purposes of the Act" and "the absurd result" which arises 
from allowing the statute of limitations to be a barrier to the 
reporting and turnover rules of this State's unclaimed property 
law.2 
References in this argument to Utah's unclaimed property 
law are to the Utah version of the Uniform Disposition of 
Unclaimed Property Act, prior to the 1983 amendments. The 1983 
Amendments, as previously indicated, adopted a form of the Uniform 
Act, § 16 (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-30(1) (1953 as amended)). 
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Petitioner contends, however, that such reliance is 
wholly misplaced. A review of the unclaimed property act 
provisions governing the periods required for the presumption of 
abandonment as compared to the applicable statute of limitations 
rules of this state (both common law and statutory) yield a 
conclusion substantially different from that of Justice Dore. The 
State's unclaimed property law is not, in fact, eviscerated by 
this Court's holding in State ex rel Baker. Analysis will lead to 
the discovery that the commencement of the period necessary to 
presume abandonment does not, in all cases, coincide with the date 
on which a "cause of action accrues" under applicable doctrines of 
State statutory and common law. A significant example is to be 
found in the area of certificates of deposit. The seven year 
presumption of abandonment period for a certificate of deposit 
commences from the "date it is payable" or from "the date of 
issuance if it is payable on demand." Section 70A-3-122 of this 
< 
State's Uniform Commercial Code in subsection (2) provides: 
"A cause of action against the obligor of a 
demand or time certificate of deposit accrues 
upon demand, but demand on a time certificate of 
deposit may not be made until on or after the , 
date of maturity." 
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-3-122(2) (1953, as amended). Clearly, 
with respect to a demand certificate of deposit, there is 
i 
potential for the abandonment period to run before the applicable 
statute of limitations since the abandonment period commences 
-8-
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running on the date of issuance and the statute of limitations 
period will only begin to run upon demand. 
Likewise, in the area of bank deposits (see Section 
78-44-2 of the Utah Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act pre-1983 
amendment) - an area of substantial potential funds and property 
for the State - no cause of action against the depository financial 
institution would accrue until some demand for withdrawal of the 
funds is made by the depositor. Absent such a demand or request, 
then no cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations does 
not begin running. In the meantime, the abandonment period 
commences running at any moment after there is an expression of 
interest in the account (activity in the account, correspondence 
relative to the account, or any other indication of interest in the 
account). Presumably then, the 12 year period with respect to any 
such account will run since the last deposit in a savings account 
or the last withdrawal. In this case, by definition, when a 12 
year period has run without any such manifestation of interest # 
(including, therefore, a demand for withdrawal), no statute of 
limitations defense would be available. There are other 
substantial examples of this same argument to be found in a review 
of this state's unclaimed property act (as in effect without the 
benefit of Section 16 of the Uniform Act). Accordingly, the 
conclusion of Justice Dore in dissent in the Puget Sound case 
clearly is without substance or meaning in this State (whatever 
might be its validity with respect to the relationship of 
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Washington's version of unclaimed property law and applicable 
statute of limitations rules for that state). 
It is, therefore, also clear error on the part of this 
Court to adopt the Justice Dore conclusion and apply it in this 
case and in this State. The said conclusion, as demonstrated 
without equivocation by the above examples, is not borne out by the 
state of the law here. 
II. IF THE STATE'S UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT IS, IN FACT, 
NOT EVISCERATED BY THE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
EXCEPTION, THEN THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE APPLICATION 
OF THAT EXCEPTION IS IMPERMISSIBLE "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION" AND MAY, 
IN FACT, BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ACTUAL INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE. 
Since the statute of limitations exception recognized by 
the Court in State ex rel Baker does not, in fact, "virtually 
nullify" this State's unclaimed property laws; and, since it is 
also not absurd to conclude that the legislature's omission of 
Section 16 of the Uniform Act was meant to allow for preservation 
of a right repeatedly recognized by this Court as a substantial 
and valued vested property right (i.e., the rights obtained or 
involved in the expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations period), Petitioner believes that it is beyond the 
authority and prerogative of this Court to circumvent the impact 
of the legislature's actions and inactions. (The Court is 
referred to the cases cited in its own opinion and in the 
Petitioner's brief for confirmation of the substantial and 
material deference paid to rights arising with respect to statute 
of limitations provisions.) Indeed, such activity is likely 
-10-
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defeating the real intention of the legislature, i.e. the preserva-
tion of the statute of limitations defenses and exceptions to the 
unclaimed property rules while still providing for substantial and 
meaningful applications of the unclaimed property laws. 
The Court cites in its opinion, the reasoning of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Treasurer and Receiver 
General v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 388 Mass. 410, 
446 N.E.2d 1376 (1983). In that case, the Massachusetts court 
cites an earlier decision in which it states that "An intention to 
enact a barren and ineffective provision is not lightly to be 
imputed to the legislature." A necessary corollary of that 
provision must be that where the act of the legislature has any 
substantive application, "irrationality or foolishness" in the 
omission of some other substantive or material portion of the same 
legislation should also "not lightly . . . be imputed to the 
legislature." Indeed, time-honored, well-reasoned, and rationally 
imposed rules of judicial restraint surrounding the infringement 
of the legislative purview, should be violated only where, in 
fact, the "barren nature of legislative activity" is clearly 
manifest by the absence of any material applicability of a given 
piece of legislation. Further, even in such instances in which 
judicial interpretation can be utilized to preserve some "meaning" 
for legislative pronouncements, such interpretation should be 
applied rationally and with careful avoidance of tortured 
construction and baseless assertions. This case is not one which 
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involves such clearly "barren enactments". Further, petitioner 
respectfully submits, and will hereafter demonstrate, that even if 
such were the case, the rationale and rules pronounced by the 
Court to provide the asserted missing substance to the subject 
legislation are not much more than arbitrary assertions without 
any stated foundation in reason. 
III. THE MODIFIED DERIVATIVE RIGHTS RULE ANNOUNCED BY 
THE COURT IN THIS CASE IS ANNOUNCED WITHOUT ANY STATED BASIS IN 
REASON AND IS WITHOUT DISCERNIBLE STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION AND 
IS, IN ANY EVENT, MISAPPLIED WITH RESPECT TO THIS CASE. 
Even assuming there is a need for the Court to "rescue" 
the legislature from the embarrassment of a meaningless and 
"barren" enactment (which petitioner has clearly shown is not the 
case here), the modified derivative rights rule proposed in the 
Court's opinion, is, upon close examination, nothing more than an 
arbitrary pronouncement. This Court in State ex rel Baker, 
without qualification or equivocation, adopted the view that 
the rights of the State under its unclaimed property act are 
• < 
••derivative." In short, the State must stand in the shoes of the 
"owner" of the property which is the subject of the unclaimed 
property law. It is apparent that there are substantial 
constitutional issues bound up in the Court's adoption of the 
derivative rights rule. However, time and space do not allow 
elaboration of the same at this point in time. 
In the opinion of the Court in the case at bar, without 
any apparent attempt to explain the rationale for the adoption of 
the same (except to say that the effect of such adoption is to 
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"save" the unclaimed property law from nullification and except 
for citation to another court's similar and apparently arbitrary 
adoption of the same), the Court adopts a modification of the 
derivative rights rule. That modification states that (a) the 
state's rights are derivative only to "substantive" rights, as 
opposed to procedural rights, and (b) that the statute of 
limitations is a "procedural" right. As pointed out above, this 
bald "pronouncement" is made in reliance upon a citation to the 
similar conclusion reached by the Supreme Courts of Alabama and 
Pennsylvania (reference is made to the Court's opinion for the 
citations to the same). Again, except for asserting the need to 
avoid the embarrassing admission that the legislature enacted 
"barren" legislation, in neither of these cited cases does the 
court making the decision state any rational basis for the 
imposition of the rule. If there is independent and substantive 
rationale and reason (in experience or otherwise) for the 
imposition of such rules, none are cited either by the referenced 
courts or by this Court. If in fact, the imposition of such rules 
has foundation in reason and logic (derived from policy, 
precedent, statute, or otherwise), none appears. Petitioner 
submits that the legitimacy of the rule of law in this State and 
in this country is threatened by the pronouncement of rules, the 
only stated justification for which, are the conclusions which the 
announcing court has deemed and pronounced desirable. While there 
may be, in fact, rational and logical underpinnings for the 
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Court's stated rule, they remain unspoken in the opinion 
promulgated by the Court. 
Petitioner is particularly concerned by the absence of 
stated reasoning for the adoption of of the second element of the 
modified derivative rights rule. As pointed out above, the rights 
derived by parties through assertion of the statute of limitations 
have traditionally and consistently been placed in the category of 
vested property rights. The apparently gratuitous assertion in 
the case at bar that they are "procedural" (whatever that means) 
is disconcerting and potentially disruptive to existing law in a 
wide scope of circumstances wholly unrelated to the statute at 
issue here. In light of the significance of such a pronouncement, 
if the Court still believes it necessary to attempt a preservation 
of the unclaimed property act by assertion of such rules, it is 
appropriate and necessary to allow all parties to brief and 
reargue the subject case on such issues before the Court adopts 
the same as the rules applicable in this State. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner respectfully submits, that the foregoing 
more than sufficiently justifies a rehearing in this matter. 
Clear error in conclusions about the effect and status of the 
subject law has occurred. Accordingly, petitioner requests that 
rehearing be granted and that opportunity be provided to all 
parties for rebriefing and argument. 
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DATED this ^ 2? day of January, 1987 • 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
L. Ridd Larson 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
RULE 3 5 CERTIFICATE 
Counsel for petitioner hereby certifies that this 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay* 
L, RIDD LARSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE * 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of January, 1987, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition For 
Rehearing were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
Joseph P. McCarthy 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
9656M 
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